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"REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS," TAKINGS LAW
ANALYSIS AND ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS IN LIGHT
OF RITH V. UNITED STA TES
C. PHILLIP WHEELER, JR.'
I. THE BACKGROUND OF REGULATORY TAKINGS
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
concludes with the words, "nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation."' Federal takings law pre-
sents many interesting issues in light of the massive increase in
governmental regulation since the founding of the United States in
1776. When the Fifth Amendment was adopted in 1789, the only
cabinet posts were the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of War, and the Attorney General. 2 Today, the
federal government consists of over 14 departments and 65 inde-
pendent agencies that regulate daily aspects of Americans' lives,
ranging from water quality to nicotine content in cigarettes.
3
These departments and agencies are endowed with incredible
powers that allow them make decisions that may diminish or de-
stroy the economic value of private property.4
An example of this administrative power is the regulation
of coal mining, which has always been a highly dangerous indus-
try that produces many environmental side effects.5 Early in the
twenty-first century, many state governments attempted to pass
regulations in hopes of lessening the negative aspects of coal min-
ing, and early on the United States Supreme Court recognized that
when government regulation went too far, it could result in a Fifth
* Staff Member, JOURNAL OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW,
J.D. expected 2004, University of Kentucky College of Law.
'U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2Detailed biographies of President Washington's first cabinet officials and a descrip-
tion of the executive branch in 1789 are available at
http://www.americanpresident.org/kotrain/courses GW/GWDomestic Affairs.htm.
'A list of the departments and agencies of the United States government as of De-
cember, 2002, is available at http://www.gov.com.
'See generally Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992)
(finding that a decision by the South Carolina Coastal Council to prohibit building on the plain-
tiffs property effected a taking since it completely wiped out the property's value as a residen-
tial lot).
SSee generally ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES AND
MATERIALS 231-302 (Fred Bosselman et al. eds., 2000).
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Amendment taking requiring compensation.6 With the expansion
of federal regulation of the coal industry in the 1930s and 40s,
Fifth Amendment takings analysis also came to apply to the agen-
cies of the federal government and their dealings with landown-
ers.
7
In May of 2001, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit handed down a significant decision concerning
regulatory takings by the federal government. Rith Energy, Inc. v.
United States8 was the culmination of a protracted battle nearly
sixteen years in the making between Rith Energy Corporation and
the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement of the
United States Department of the Interior (OSM). 9 The litigation
arose over the latter's refusal to certify Rith's plan to deal with the
problem of acid mine drainage (AMD) at the site of two coal
seams that the corporation had leased from the federal govern-
ment.' o In June 1985, Rith had purchased the right to mine coal on
approximately 250 acres of land situated along the Sewanee and
Richland coal seams in Tennessee for $33,500." At the time it
acquired the leases, Rith was aware that the mining would invade
the rock strata situated above the Sewanee Conglomerate aquifer
that provided drinking water to the local community. 12 In order to
receive a mining permit, Rith was required to submit soil samples
to demonstrate that the proposed surface mining plan would not
disturb the aquifer through AMD runoff.'3  Rith's samples estab-
lished that the danger of AMD from the mining operations on the
6
See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
7For an overview of the expansion of federal oversight of the coal mining industry,
see generally ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS, supra
note 5.
8




'5Rith Energy, Inc. v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 108, 111 n.3 (Fed. CI.1999), aff'd,
247 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Rith ]. AMD is defined by federal regulations as
"water with a pH of less than 6.0 and in which total acidity exceeds total alkalinity, discharged
from an active, inactive or abandoned surface coal mine and reclamation operation or from an
area affected by surface coal mining and reclamation operations." 30 C.F.R. § 701.5 (1998).
AMD occurs when certain types of acidic soil are exposed to air and water. Once AMD begins,
the chemical reaction that creates the toxic product becomes self-sustaining and can continue
for years, even after all mining activity has ceased. AMD can adversely affect the quality of
surface water by, inter alia, lowering its pH level, reducing its natural alkalinity, increasing its
total hardness, and adding undesirable amounts of iron, manganese, aluminum, sulfates, and
other elements and suspended materials. AMD also adversely affects groundwater by introduc-
ing contaminants and by changing pH levels, thereby threatening local residential drinking-
water supplies. Id.
"Rith I1, 247 F.3d at 1359.
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coal seams was minimal. Accordingly, OSM issued a five-year
permit for Rith to mine the coal seams on January 3, 1986.14
On March 25, 1986, in response to requests by local area
residents and a regional environmental group, OSM decided to
resample the soil at Rith's operation and found that these new
samples were approximately 250% more acidic than indicated by
Rith's tests and that the neutralization capacity of the soil was near
zero. 5 OSM suspended Rith's permit to mine the Sewanee seam
on June 27, 1986, pending submission of a new plan for handling
the highly acidic drainage.' 6  In July 1986, during the re-
permitting process, Rith received permission to begin mining the
Richland seam because OSM believed that this could be accom-
plished without disturbing the Sewanee Conglomerate. 7 Rith con-
tinued to mine the Richland seam until OSM finally ordered the
corporation to cease all mining operations in May 1987.8 By the
time OSM issued a cessation order, Rith had extracted a total of
35,655 tons of coal, which represented about 9.3% of approxi-
mately 385,000 tons of available coal existing within the bounda-
ries of the two leases.19
After several unsuccessful administrative challenges to
OSM's decision, Rith sued the United States in the Eastern Dis-
trict Court of Tennessee seeking a review of OSM's actions and
contending that its property had been taken without compensation
in violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.20 Rith
later dropped its appeal of the correctness of the OSM decision,
and the District Court dismissed the claim with prejudice.2' The
District Court then transferred Rith's takings claim to the Court of
Federal Claims in May 1992.22 Following the granting of sum-
mary judgment for the government by the Court of Federal








'7Rith 1, 44 Fed. CI. at 110.
181d.
'91d. at 11 n.4.
'0Rith II, 247 F.3d at 1355.
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II. RITH I: RITH'S LEASE TO MINE THE SEWANEE AND RICHLAND
COAL SEAMS DID NOT ENTITLE IT TO DO SO IN A MANNER THAT
WOULD ENDANGER PUBLIC SAFETY
While the language of the "Takings Clause" of the Fifth
Amendment has been interpreted to support compensation on aper
se basis where actual physical invasion of a landowner's property
by the government occurs, when the taking occurs as a result of
government regulation, compensation is not always required.24 In
his comment discussing the Rith case for the Federal Circuit Bar
Journal, James Reginald Benjamin, Jr. states that Rith,
confirms that nuisance law is a viable option to
employ in defending land-use regulations
against a regulatory takings claim. It demon-
strates the significance of utilizing common law,
in conjunction with statutory law, for the pur-
poses of (1) promoting the health, safety, and
general welfare of the public; and (2) balancing
the competing public interests between govern-
ment and property owners.25
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass 'n v. Debenedicts,26 the
United States Supreme Court stated that, "[1long ago it was recog-
nized that 'all property in this country is held under the implied
obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the
community,'... and the Takings Clause did not transform that
principle to one that requires compensation whenever the [gov-
ernment] asserts its power to enforce it." 27 That such restrictions
are inherent in the title to property was a principle laid down by
the United States Supreme Court in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council'8 In Lucas, the Court said that a state could avoid
having to pay compensation for a taking if the nature of the
owner's estate shows that the intended use was not part of the title
to begin with. 29 The analysis of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council was adopted by the Federal Circuit in its decision in Love-
2 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.25James Reginald Benjamin, Jr., Rith Energy v. United States "The Best of Both
Worlds;" Use of Common Law and Statutory Law Together in Applying the Nuisance Excep-
tion to Defend a Takings Claim, II Fed. Circuit B.J. 855 (2001-2002).
2 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. Debenedicts, 480 U.S. 470,491-92 (1987).
27Id.
2 Lucas, 505 US. at 1003.2
lId at 1027.
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ladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States,30 which stated that so long as
the application of a federal regulation would do no more than mir-
ror a decision under state property law, no compensable taking
would occur.
31
OSM based its decision to deny Rith's permit on the 1977
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA), 32 which
had the express objective of establishing "a nationwide program to
protect society and the environment from the adverse effects of
surface coal mining operations. 33 Toward this end, OSM was
charged with the task of regulating the surface coal mining indus-
try and prohibiting mining operations that endanger public health
and safety or harm the environment. 34 The specific provision of
the Act that authorized OSM's actions stated that:
any permitee is in violation of any requirement
of this [Act], which condition, practice, or vio-
lation also creates an imminent danger to the
health or safety of the public, or is causing, or
can reasonably be expected to cause signifi-
cant, imminent environmental harm to land,
air, or water resources, the Secretary or his au-
thorized representative shall immediately order
a cessation of surface coal mining and recla-
mation operations or the portion thereof rele-
vant to the condition, practice, or violation."
Using the analysis of Lucas and Loveladies Harbor, Inc.,
the Court of Claims stated that the central question in the Rith I
case was whether Tennessee nuisance law would allow the issu-
ance of an injunction restraining Rith from proceeding with sur-
face mining that produced a high probability of AMD into the Se-
wanee Conglomerate aquifer.36 The court held in the affirmative.
Since the federal action by OSM did nothing more than mirror the
result that would have been achieved under state nuisance law, the
decision to proscribe mining did not effect a Fifth Amendment
'
5
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir.1994).
"Id at 1179.
3 Rith ,44 Fed. CI. at 112 (citing Pith Energy, Inc., No. NX 89-i-PR at 26 (Dep't of
Interior March 28, 1989)).
"30 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (2003).
54
Rith 1, 44 Fed. C1, at 108.
"30 U.S.C. § 1271(2) (1994).
"Rith 1, 44 Fed. C1. at 114.
2002-20031
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taking." Rith made a motion for reconsideration of the decision
by the Court of Claims on the grounds that the corporation had
been issued a permit by Tennessee authorities and thus was not in
violation of Tennessee nuisance law.38 The court denied this mo-
tion stating, "Whether the enforcement of these regulations is ac-
complished by the state regulatory body or by the federal officials
acting under the authority of SMCRA is not an issue relevant to
the takings analysis."39
III. RITH III: THE GOVERNMENT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE RITH A
PERMIT DID NOT COMPRISE A "TAKING" UNDER THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT BECAUSE RITH'S INVESTMENT-BACKED
EXPECTATIONS REQUIRED THAT IT OBTAIN A PERMIT
Rith appealed the decision in Rith II to the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit, restating the claim that OSM's deci-
sion to deny a mining permit for its leases had amounted to a Fifth
Amendment taking.4 Rith invited the court to revisit its earlier
decision in Del-Rio Drilling Programs, Inc. v. United States,4'
which held that "a plaintiff could bring a takings claim without
first challenging the lawfulness of the government's action, or
establishing the scope of its property interest, in an administrative
proceeding. 4 2 In effect, this was an attempt by Rith to sidestep
the nuisance issue upon which the Court of Claims had based the
earlier decision. Rith argued that by denying its permit to mine,
OSM had effected a "categorical taking." In other words, the gov-
ernment regulation had deprived the property owners of "all eco-r 43 ., _
nomically viable use of the property. The significance of this
argument is that if the OSM decision did in fact effect a categori-
cal taking, "analyzing whether or not compensation is due does
not require an inquiry into whether the plaintiff had reasonable
investment-backed expectations that were defeated by the regula-
tory measure that gave rise to the takings claim." 44 This would, in
"Id. (citing Tennessee's Water Control Act of 1977, TENN. CODE ANN. §69-3-102
(2002)). Rith argued that since Tennessee had given them a permit to mine despite this Act, that
the contrary decision by OSM did not mirror state nuisance law, and thus did constitute a com-
pensable taking per the reasoning in Lucas and Loveladies Harbour.
3"Rith Energy v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 366 (Fed.Cl. 1999) [hereinafter Rith II].39
1d.
"Rith 111, 247 F.3d at 1361-62.4t
Del-Rio Drilling Programs, Inc. v. United States, 146 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir.1998).
'
2
Rith 111, 247 F.3d at 1365.
'3Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 231 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
"Rith 111, 247 F.3d at 1362.
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effect, have given Rith a nearly $5 million windfall since, as men-
tioned earlier, it had purchased the leases for only $33,500.
Rith stated that it expected to extract approximately
385,000 tons of coal from the entire 250-acre area, and thus, the
denial of the mining permit had deprived Rith of the substantial
profit that it had expected to reap under the leases. 45 However, the
Court of Appeals found Rith's argument lacking since Rith had
extracted approximately 35,700 tons of coal from the leased prop-
erty before the government ordered it to cease operations and had
realized a profit of approximately $14 per ton, or a total profit of
$500,000.46 Rith countered that the proper measure of its damages
should be calculated as of September 1988, since it was on that
date that OSM rejected its final toxic materials handling plan,
thus, depriving it of any additional economic value.47 However,
such an analysis conflicts with the Supreme Court's holding in
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. Debenedicts:48 "A claimant's
parcel of property could not first be divided into what was taken
and what was left for the purpose of demonstrating the taking of
the former to be complete and hence compensable.'
'4
Rith's proposed analysis is also in contrast with the Court
of Appeals' opinion in Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States,
where the court stated that "[I]n determining whether a taking is
categorical, the owner's opportunity to recoup its investment or
better, subject to the regulation, cannot be ignored."5 ° Following
this line of reasoning, the Court of Appeals concluded that al-
though Rith earned far less from the coal leases than it had ex-
pected, the fact that the company had achieved a profit of over
$500,000 for its investors prevented OSM's regulatory restraints
from being considered a categorical taking.5"
Using the analysis adopted in Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v.






RKeystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n, 480 U.S. at 470.491d. at 478-79.
"
5
Rith I1, 247 F.3d at 1363 (quoting Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791
F.2d 893, 905 (Fed. Cir.1986)).
"Id. at 1364.
52In Palm Beach Isles Assocs., 231 F.3d 1354 (2000), the Court of Appeals quotes
the so called Penn. Central test set out by the Supreme Court in Penn. Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), to determine whether or not a regulatory taking had
occurred. The factors are 1) whether there was a denial of economically valuable use of the
property as a result of the regulation 2) whether there was investment backed expectations and
3) whether there was a proper balance between private ights and public need. Palm Beach
Isles, 231 F.3d at 1358 (quoting Penn. Central Transportation Co., 438 U.S. 104).
2002-20031
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second prong of a non-categorical regulatory takings inquiry -
whether Rith had a reasonable investment-backed expectation that
it would not be subject to such restraints when it acquired the coal
leases from the government.5 3 The Court of Appeals observed that
SMCRA had already been in effect for eight years at the time Rith
purchased the leases from the federal government and that the
leases had contained provisions warning Rith about the uncertain-
ties of obtaining the mining permits that were necessary to remove
the coal. 4 In effect, the court held Rith to a "should have known"
standard by asserting that even if Rith could prove that it had no
actual knowledge that it would not be able to obtain a permit to
mine the site if AMD would result, it had constructive knowledge
as a participant in the coal mining business. 5 Thus, Rith assumed
the risk of economic loss for not thoroughly examining the prop-
erty.
56
In the end, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
achieved the same result without revisiting the nuisance ruling of
the Court of Claims. However, while stating that "[they] need not
reach the question whether Rith's mining activities would have
been prohibited by Tennessee nuisance law," the court hinted that
had it chosen to do so it could have upheld the decision based on
this line of reasoning. 7 The court went on to say:
[SMCRA]'s provisions include environmental
performance standards that directly address acid
mine drainage and make clear that surface min-
ing will not be permitted unless the permittee
minimizes the 'disturbances to the prevailing
hydrologic balance at the mine-site and in asso-
ciated offsite areas and to the quality and quan-
tity of water in surface and ground water sys-
tems ... by avoiding acid or other toxic mine
drainage...'s8
The court stated that, "Rith could not reasonably have ex-
pected that it would be free from regulatory oversight with regard




'81d. at 1364 (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(10)).
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to the potential for acid mine drainage. ... ,,59 Also, as the court had
previously stated in M&J Coal Co. v. United States,60 at the time
Rith acquired its mining rights, "[ilt knew or should have known
that it would not be able to mine in such a way as to endanger pub-
lic health or safety and that any state authorization it may have
received was subordinate to the national standards that were estab-
lished by SMCRA and enforced by OSM.",
6 !
Why the Court of Appeals decided to ignore the nuisance
issue and focus on Rith's "reasonable expectations" is unclear.
62
It could be that it was anticipating the Supreme Court's decision in
Palazzo v. Rhode Island,63 which was handed down two months
after Rith 111.64 In Palazzo, Justice O'Connor writing for the five-
justice majority reiterated that among the factors to be considered
is the regulation's "interference with reasonable investment
backed expectations., 65 Rith's main argument in its petition for
rehearing is that after Palazzo, "[t]he mere fact that an owner
bought after a regulatory scheme was passed cannot defeat a par-
tial takings claim. 66 However, this was seen by the circuit court
as reading too much into Palazzo: "In rejecting a 'blanket rule,'
however, the Court did not suggest that the reasonable expecta-
tions of persons in a highly regulated industry are not relevant to
determining whether particular regulatory action constitutes a tak-
ing. '67 Despite the court's focus on Pith's "reasonable investment
backed expectations," in Rith IV, the Court of Appeals again
seemed to leave the door open to the nuisance analysis used by the
District Court in Rith I when it said:
With respect to the nature of the governmental
action, the revocation of the permit, as we sug-
59Rith III, 247 F.3d at 1364.
60M&J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148, 1154 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
6"Rith II1, 247 F.3d at 1364 (quoting M&J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d at
1154). 62Benjamin, supra note 25. Benjamin hypothesizes that perhaps the court wanted to
answer the question of contractual obligations on the part of the federal government. "Once a
vested right is procured by a landowner on the basis of government action, a contractual obliga-
tion is created between the government entity and that landowner, thereby affording the land-
owner the realization of a clear, protected legal interest. A contractual obligation cannot be
wiped out without paying just compensation toward the landowner who reasonably relied on
that contractual obligation." Id. at 884.
6 Palazzo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
6See Rith v. United States, 270 F.3d 1347, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Rith
I.
65 d. at 1350-51 (quoting Palazzo, 533 U.S. at 606).
"Rith IV, 247 F.3d at 1350.67Id. at 1350.
2002-2003]
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gested earlier, was an exercise of the police
power directed at protecting the safety, health,
and welfare of the communities surrounding the
Rith mine site by preventing harmful runoff.
The exercise of the police power to address that
kind of general public welfare concern is the
type of government action that has typically
been regarded as not requiring compensation for
the burdens it imposes on private parties who
are affected by the regulations.
68
The importance of this language is that although the Federal
Circuit chose to base its decision on an objective analysis of Rith's
reasonable expectations when it purchased the coal lease from the
federal government, potential litigators should not ignore the use
of state nuisance law to stop mining that is potentially hazardous
to the environment.
IV. TO THE EXTENT THAT RITH BASED ITS TAKINGS CLAIM ON THE
DENIAL OF A PERMIT BY OSM, IT MUST FAIL, SINCE A PLAINTIFF
CANNOT USE TAKINGS LAW TO SIDESTEP THE CONGRESSIONALLY
MANDATED ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW PROCEEDING
In reality, at the heart of Rith III was a collateral attack by
the coal company on the lawfulness of OSM's rejection of its toxic
materials handling plan; however, the Federal Circuit rejected this
challenge saying that the issue was not properly before them.
69
Under Rith's theory, the taking occurred co-extensively with the
allegedly incorrect decision by OSM to deny them a permit to
mine the seams. 70 Attempting to use the court's analysis in Del-
Rio Drilling Programs, Inc. v. United States71 to challenge OSM's
decision, Rith argued that it was entitled to a review of the admin-
istrative decision on the grounds that the decision itself resulted in
the, taking and thus was properly at issue before the Federal Cir-
cuit.72 While Del-Rio did state that a plaintiff need not be success-
ful on the challenge to the administrative decision to succeed in a
takings action, the plaintiff in that case was not merely seeking to
"id. at 1352.61Rith III, 247 F.3d 1355, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
7Laguna Gatuna, Inc. v. United States, 50 Fed. CI. 336, 342 (Fed.CI. 2001)(citing
Rith I1, 247 F.3d at 1355)).7 1Del-Rio Drilling Programs, Inc. v. United States, 146 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1998).72
See Rith 11I, 247 F.3d at 1365-66.
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challenge an administrative decision as Rith was attempting to
do. 73 Instead, the plaintiff in Del-Rio was asserting that the gov-
ernment action was wrong regardless of the lawfulness of the ad-1i 4
ministrative proceedings. Rith, on the other hand, was trying to
say that it should prevail on its takings claim precisely because the
agency acted in violation of the statute or regulation. 75
As previously mentioned, at the initiation of its original
lawsuit in Tennessee District Court, Rith had filed a challenge to
the administrative decision by OSM, but then moved for voluntary
dismissal of the claim, which was granted with prejudice.76 Hav-
ing not litigated OSM's decision through the proper administrative
channels specified by Congress in SMCRA, the Federal Circuit
refused to allow Pith to renew this challenge through the subter-
fuge of a takings claim in the Court of Federal Claims.77 The ef-
fect of this denial was to require that any takings argument made
by Rith before the circuit accept the action by OSM as proper and
lawful. 78 This in effect doomed any case for Pith since the Circuit
Court noted that the company did not have a reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectation that it would be permitted to mine while
producing acid mine discharge in violation of SMCRA. There-
fore, Rith's takings claim had to fail. 79
V. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most important lesson to be taken away from
the Rith case is that multiple avenues of reasoning exist that allow
a court to arrive at a just decision in a regulatory takings case. As
James Reginald Benjamin, Jr. remarked in his study of state nui-
sance law, the final decision by the Court of Appeals in Rith III,
based on the "reasonable expectations" of the landowner, seems to
represent a middle ground between the competing interests of the
needs of the community as represented by the government, and the
private property rights guaranteed by the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.8 First, the Court of Appeals impliedly recog-
nized the common law nuisance doctrine as interpreted by Lucas8'
3See Del-Rio Drilling Programs, Inc., 146 F.3d at 1358.74
1d.






"°See generally Benjamin, supra note 25.8'See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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when it stated that "reasonable expectations of landowners," or in
Rith's case, a lessee, cannot include expectations that they will be
able to exploit their land in a way that causes damage to their
neighbors or the community at large.82 This interpretation allowed
the court to severely restrict the obvious attempt by Rith to obtain
a windfall from the federal government through a takings claim
when mining operations in an area would have presented a human
hazard and a hazard to the environment.
Second, the court analyzed the takings claim from the date
of the lease rather than the date of the alleged taking. Thus, the
court took into account the substantial profits that Rith made on
the coal that it was able to mine before it received the cessation
order from OSM when determining whether the taking was cate-
gorical and, therefore, compensable. s3  This line of reasoning
again protects the government and taxpayers from companies that
may receive a windfall when government regulation diminishes
their anticipated profit-margin. 4 In order to achieve this end, the
court again looked at Rith's "reasonable expectations" and de-
cided that an objectively reasonable coal operator in Rith's situa-
tion, as a member of the most regulated industry in the United
States,85 could not have believed they would be able to mine ab-
sent a satisfactory handling plan for acid mine drainage.8 6 There-
fore, at a minimum, Rith could be said to have had constructive
knowledge that government regulations could injure its profits on
the Sewanee lease job or destroy them altogether.8 7 The court's
"reasonable expectations" interpretation also remained safely
within the bounds of Palazzo:88 although the Supreme Court re-
jected a blanket rule negating takings claims when the plaintiff
had constructive notice of an applicable regulatory scheme, the
case did not say that upon notice, an analysis of the person's "rea-
sonable expectations" was irrelevant.
8 9
Finally, Rith III made it clear to potential plaintiffs that the
Federal Circuit will view attempts to skirt congressionally man-
dated administrative review processes through the disguise of a
regulatory takings claim with a jaundiced eye.90 The Court of Ap-
"2SeegenerallyRilh III, 247 F.3d 1355, 1365-66 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
831d. at 1360.
"Id.
"See generally Bosselman, supra note 5.
' Rith I1, 247 F.3d at 1364.
8 Palazzo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
ORith IV, 270 F.3d 1347, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
"'Rith I1, 247 F.3d at 1364.
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peals stated that although a taking might arise independently of the
regulatory action by the federal agency, if a plaintiff intends to use
this as the basis for his complaint, he must follow all the proper
appeals procedures before seeking a forum in federal court.9'
Although negative effects on the coal industry or the litiga-
tion process for regulatory takings claims do not appear on the
face of the holding in Rith III, one could hypothesize that the case
might have long-term negative effects on the coal industry, par-
ticularly in the eastern United States. In the past fifty years, there
has been a dramatic decrease in the number of coal mines in the
eastern United States, while the exact opposite has been seen in
the western states like Wyoming and Montana. 92 This is due to the
easier accessibility of coal in this area through surface mining.
93
These deposits are located in mostly uninhabited areas where envi-
ronmental concerns such as AMD are of little or no concern.
94
The situation is exactly the opposite in eastern Tennessee, eastern
Kentucky, and West Virginia, where reserves are often located in
close proximity to people, as was the case in Rith, and therefore,
present a potential hazard to the communities if improperly
mined.95
By saying that a company cannot have "reasonable expec-
tations" to mine where their actions would potentially harm com-
munities, Rith III undoubtedly makes it more expensive to develop
toxic waste handling plans and diminishes the certainty in invest-
ment for companies like Rith. This could cause mining operations
to move, thereby increasing unemployment in one of the poorest
regions of the country96 and allowing huge amounts of natural re-
sources to go to waste. 97 It also begs the question of whether the
government gets a windfall because it both leases the reserves and
is the parent of the agency that decides to issue or deny permits in
some instances.
98
Although the lease in Rith was cheaply priced and con-
91
1d.
' 2Bosselman, supra note 5 (stating that as of 2000, Wyoming and Montana contain






97Rith 111, 247 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. CiT. 2001). As previously mentioned, Rith
mined only 35,700 tons of the estimated 250,000 tons of minable coal in the Sewanee stream.
It made a profit of $14 per ton on this coal. If factored out, this means that over $3 million
worth of coal was left unmined.
9"Bosselman, supra note 5 (stating that as of 2000, Wyoming and Montana contain
14% and 25% of accessible U.S. coal reserves respectively).
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tained clauses about being subject to the approval of a mine per-
mit, the question becomes whether the denial of a permit by OSM
effectively gives the United States government a $3,000,000 wind-
fall in unmined coal reserves that might be exploited at some time
in the future. Most coal leases are for a limited number of years,
therefore, it is reasonable to assume that Rith III will make mining
companies more timid in their purchases of eastern coal leases as
the denial of a permit effectively takes their right to profit from
the coal covered by the lease. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals'
requirement that a company go through lengthy and expensive
administrative appeals before having access to judicial courts
gives little incentive to purchase such risky investments.9 9
As an alternative, perhaps those who wish to enter the coal
business in the eastern United States should view Rith III as a
word of warning from the Court of Appeals. If the government
offers a profitable coal lease and the price seems too good to be
true, investors should thoroughly research the potential environ-
mental ramifications of mining the site before signing on the dot-
ted line. There is a strong chance that they will never be permitted
to break ground, and if this turns out to be the case, there will be
no compensation for the regulatory action.
99Rith Ill, 247 F.3d at 135-66.
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